Mercer Law Review
Volume 65
Number 4 Eleventh Circuit Survey

Article 18

7-2014

An Emerging Liability: Managing FLSA Exposure from Internship
Programs in the Private Sector
Chris J. Perniciaro

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Perniciaro, Chris J. (2014) "An Emerging Liability: Managing FLSA Exposure from Internship Programs in
the Private Sector," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 65: No. 4, Article 18.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol65/iss4/18

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Comment

An Emerging Liability: Managing FLSA
Exposure from Internship Programs in the
Private Sector

I.

INTRODUCTION

According to the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) of the Department
of Labor (DOL), unpaid internships in private for-profit businesses are
illegal under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA or the Act)' except for
very narrow circumstances. 2 Consistent with the WHD's position, civil
litigation against employers providing unpaid internships has significantly increased via the private right of action contained in the statute.3
Over twenty lawsuits have been filed by unpaid interns alleging
violations of federal and state minimum wage laws.' A major force
behind these new lawsuits is Glatt v. Fox SearchlightPictures Inc.,' a

1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2012).
2. Steven Greenhouse, The Unpaid Intern, Legal or Not, N.Y. TmEs, Apr. 3, 2010, at
B1.
3. Stephen Suen, Tracking Intern Lawsuits, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 7, 2014, 3:48 PM),
http://projects.propublica.org/graphics/intern-suits.
4.
5.

Id.
293 F.R.D. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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June 2013 decision from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, holding that two unpaid interns were
employees under the protection of the FLSA.6 Marking the first victory
for unpaid interns in wage and hour litigation, the decision is a
cautionary symbol to employers that shows the significant liability they
might incur as a result of internship programs, and the potential for
plaintiff's lawyers who can obtain certification of collective actions.
The FLSA is the main federal law regulating the wages and hours of
employees. Under the Act, a national minimum wage and a maximum
hour limit per workweek are set.' In the FLSA, Congress states the
harms it intended to remedy through the legislation:
[T]he existence, in industries engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health,
efficiency, and general well-being of workers (1) causes commerce and
the channels and instrumentalities of commerce to be used to spread
and perpetuate such labor conditions among the workers of the several
States; (2)burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce;
(3) constitutes an unfair method of competition in commerce; (4) leads
to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of goods in commerce; and (5) interferes with the orderly and fair
marketing of goods in commerce.8
Congress intended to correct the above mentioned consequences of poor
labor conditions through the FLSA "as rapidly as practicable . .. without
substantially curtailing employment or earning power." Subsequently,
Congress created the WHD to enforce the provisions of the Act.o
This Article is an analysis of recent lawsuits alleging FLSA minimum
wage and maximum hour violations involving interns or volunteers at
for-profit organizations, and a guide for companies with internship
programs on how to avoid liability for FLSA violations. Part I provides
a brief history of federal wage and hour regulation by examining the line
of Supreme Court cases that form the foundation for unpaid internship
litigation. Part II illustrates how the number of unpaid internships has
increased in recent decades, why the expansion occurred, and how state
and federal government has responded to the growing presence of
internships. Also, Part II reviews relevant federal cases leading up to
Glatt, along with a detailed review of this seminal case. Part III

6. Id. at 534.

7.
8.
9.
10.

29 U.S.C.
29 U.S.C.
29 U.S.C.
29 U.S.C.

§§ 206-207 (2012).
§ 202(a).
§ 202(b).
§ 204(a).

2014]

MANAGING FLSA EXPOSURE

1133

provides guidance on how unpaid internships should be structured to
comply with current legal standards.
II.

HISTORY OF THE FLSA AND COVERAGE UNDER THE ACT

Before the enactment of the FLSA, the freedom of private parties to
determine the terms of employment relationships counter-acted state
and federal attempts to regulate such associations.n The United States

Supreme Court made itself clear in Lochner v. New Yorkl 2 that
individuals have the right to freely determine the terms of their
employment agreements without governmental interference."
In
Lochner, the Court struck down a New York state law setting the
maximum hours bakers could work per week at bakeries.' The Court
concluded the maximum of sixty hours per week, or ten hours per day,
was an arbitrary interference with the freedom to contract. 5 Unlike
laws that set maximum hours for workers in dangerous industries to
prevent injuries (miners or smelters), the law regulating bakers' hours
did not serve the state's interest in the safety of its citizens."6 Justice
Peckham wrote that "the freedom of master and employee to contract
with each other in relation to their employment . .. cannot be prohibited
or interfered with, without violating the Federal Constitution." 7
Resistance to wage and hour laws continued after Lochner in a series
of Supreme Court decisions,'" until the mid-1930s.' 9 The Court's
staunch opposition to federal legislation restricting the terms of
employment agreements subsided after President Franklin Delanor
Roosevelt's court packing threat in 1936, which caused a change in
judicial opinion referred to as a "switch in time."20 In West Coast Hotel

11. E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
12. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
13. Id. at 64.
14. Id. at 52, 64-65.
15. Id. at 62, 64.
16. Id. at 54-55, 57. The authority of a state to provide for the safety of workers in
dangerous industries was grounded in the states' general police power. Id. at 54.
17. Id. at 64.
18. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587,618 (1936) (striking down state
law allowing the fixing of women's wages); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495, 521-22, 551 (1935) (striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act of
1933, which set maximum hours per day and week); Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of D.C.,
261 U.S. 525, 539, 562 (1923) (striking down minimum-wage law for women and children
employed in the District of Columbia on the grounds that the statute interfered with the
freedom to contract).
19. Jonathan Grossman, FairLabor StandardsAct of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a
Minimum Wage, 101 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 22, 23-24 (June 1978).
20. Id. at 23.
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21
the five-four decision illustrated the Court's shift by
Co. v. Parrish,
upholding a state minimum-wage law for hotel employees. 22 The
following year Congress passed the FLSA, establishing a federal
minimum wage and maximum hour restrictions for employees."
Upholding the constitutionality of the FLSA, the Court held in United
States v. Darby24 that the Act was a valid exercise of Congress's
Commerce Clause authority, firmly establishing the Court's changed
perspective on federal wage and hour regulation.
Although the constitutionality of the Act was settled in Darby, the
Court was faced with a new task of determining the FLSA's scope of
coverage. 26 The FLSA mandates that only employees are to be paid a
designated minimum wage, 27 and only employees are entitled to one
and one-half times their regular hourly rate if they work more than forty
hours in a workweek.28 Therefore, whether an individual is an
employee within the meaning of the FLSA is crucial. Congress however
decided to include a redundant and unhelpful definition describing an
employee as "any individual employed by an employer."2 Still, the
drafters provided some guidance by defining an employer as "any person
acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to
an employee,"o and the term employ as "to suffer or permit to work."3 '
Senator Hugo Black, the sponsor of the FLSA, expressed on the Senate
floor that the term employee had "the broadest definition that has ever
been included in any one act." 2 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the term liberally.33 Senator Black's broad interpretation

21. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
22. Id. at 388, 400.
23. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-07).
24. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
25. Id. at 118, 125-26. In Darby, the Court stated:
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation
of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so
affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to
make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end,
the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
Id. at 118.
26. See United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 361-63 (1945).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 207(aX1).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 203(eX1).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
32. 81 CoNG. REC. 7656, 7656-57 (1937); see also Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. at 363 n.3.
33. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (noting the term
employee has "striking breadth" in the FLSA); Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366
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was acknowledged by the Court in United States v. Rosenwasser,'
when it determined that workers paid at a piece rate, rather than by the
hour, were within the definition of employee." Significant to the
decision were the Act's remedial objectives:
Neither the policy of the Act nor the legislative history gives any real
basis for excluding piece workers from the benefits of the statute. This
legislation was designed to raise substandard wages and to give
additional compensation for overtime work as to those employees
within its ambit, thereby helping to protect this nation from the evils
and dangers resulting from wages too low to buy the bare necessities
of life and from long hours of work injurious to health.36
Therefore, the Court held congressional intent does not permit "distinction or discrimination based upon the method of employee compensation."
Despite the FLSA's broad coverage, the Court in Walling v. Portland
Terminal Co." carved out a significant exception from the definition of
employee for trainees." The Court in Walling held that unpaid rail
yard brakemen trainees were not employees of a railroad.4 0 The
trainees were required to undergo preliminary training for an average
of seven to eight days without pay before they were eligible for, but not
guaranteed fulltime employment. At first the trainees did nothing but
observe regular employees, but eventually they moved on to actual work
under close supervision. None of the trainees displaced regular
employees, and the trainees did not expedite the company's business, but
rather would often slow activities in the yard." Rejecting the use of
common law or other statutory employer-employee classifications, the
Court instead described FLSA definitions as comprehensive enough to
cover "many persons and working relationships, which prior to [the] Act,
were not deemed to fall within an employer-employee category."
Covered under the Act are "trainees, beginners, apprentices, or learners
if they are employed to work for an employer for compensation," whether

U.S. 28, 31-32 (1961); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728-29 (1947);
Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. at 362-63.
34. 323 U.S. 360 (1945).
35. Id. at 363 n.3, 364.
36. Id. at 361 (quoting S. REP. NO. 75-884 (1937)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Id. at 362.
38. 330 U.S. 148 (1947).
39. Id. at 152.
40. Id. at 153.
41. Id. at 149-50.
42. Id. at 150-51.
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through an express or implied agreement; however, individuals who
work for only their own interests are not employees of those who aid and
instruct the individuals.'
Applying these principles, the Court held
the brakemen were not employees under the Act because the railroads
did not receive any immediate advantage from the brakemen's work,
while the brakemen received the benefit of free instruction."
Later in the same year, the Court expressly adopted a broad interpretation of employee in Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,"' giving FLSA
terms the comprehensive definitions described in Walling."
In
Rutherford, the WHD sought to enjoin the owners of a meat processing
plant from violating the overtime provisions of the FLSA in regards to
its plant workers. The Court concluded that the plant workers were
employees, and disregarded that the workers were formally titled
independent contractors.' In lieu of examining isolated factors like
formal titles, the Court held "that the determination of the [employment]
relationship does not depend on such isolated factors but rather upon the
circumstances of the whole activity." 9 Because the plant workers were
part of an integrated unit of production and their work followed the
usual path of employees, the Court found coverage under the Act."
One reason the Court adopted a broad interpretation of the term
employee was that the FLSA's definition of employ is derived from state
child labor statutes, which used the phrase "suffer or permit to work" in
place of employ." These statutes phrased their broad prohibitions on
child labor by dictating to employers that they "shall not employ
[minors] by contract, nor shall [they] permit by acquiescence, nor suffer
by a failure to hinder."52 When the FLSA was enacted in 1938, thirtytwo states and the District of Columbia had child labor statutes using
similar phrasing to describe employ." The statutes were specifically
constructed to prevent employers from evading the prohibitions by

43. Id. at 151-52.
44. Id. at 153.
45. 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
46. See id. at 728-29; see also Darden, 503 U.S. at 325-26.
47. 331 U.S. at 723.
48. Id. at 729.
49. Id. at 730.
50. Id. at 729.
51. Id. at 728 & n.6; see also Bruce Goldstein, et al., Enforcing FairLabor Standards
in the ModernAmerican Sweatshop: Rediscoveringthe StatutoryDefinition ofEmployment,
46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1030-55 (1999).
52. Goldstein, supra note 51, at 1041 (quoting Curtis & Gartaide Co. v. Pigg, 134 P.
1125, 1129 (Okla. 1913)).
53. Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 728 n.7.
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claiming children workers were not employees. By including the term
suffer, the statute covered the typical express employment relationship,
while the term permit encompassed acquiesces and implicit assent,
allowing for broader coverage."
The Court in Rutherford also noted other Supreme Court decisions
defining the employer-employee relationship for purposes of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 6 and the Social Security Act (SSA)'
were "persuasive" when determining coverage under the FLSA." For
example, in NLRB v. Hearst Publications,Inc.," the Court held that
whether workers fall within the definition of employee under the NLRA
requires an examination of the history, terms, and purposes of the
legislation.60 Justice Rutledge explained that when interpreting the
term employee, state agency law is not considered, rather the term
should be interpreted using federal law "in the light of the mischief to
be corrected and the end to be attained."6'
In subsequent Supreme Court cases, the analysis of whether employment exists under the FLSA was specified as an examination of the
economic realities of the relationships.6 2 Under the Court's economic
realities test appearing in Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative,
Inc.,63 courts must consider the functional aspects of the relationship,
such as the worker's independence, compensation method, and the
principal's authority over the worker, rather than technical concepts
such as formal titles. 64 Consequently, titling a worker's position intern

54. Goldstein, supra note 51, at 1040.
55. Id. at 1041.
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2012).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 301-11397mm (2012).
58. Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 723-24. But see Darden, 503 U.S. at 324, 325-26 (holding
that the FLSA definition of employee is broader than the common law agency definition
used in the NLRA and SSA).
59. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
60. Id. at 124.
61. Id. at 123-24 (quoting S. Chi. Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251,259 (1940)).
The Court in a later case, United States v. Silk, came to a similar conclusion when
interpreting the term employee under the SSA. 331 U.S. 704, 705, 718-19 (1947).
However, Congress later amended the NLRA and SSA in reaction to Hearstand Silk with
the purpose of forcing the courts to apply common law agency principles. Darden,503 U.S.
at 324-25. The Supreme Court would later revisit these amendments to clarify their effect.
See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
62. Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 33.
63. 366 U.S. 28 (1961).
64. Id. at 32-33; see also Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 729.
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or volunteer does not mean the worker is not an employee covered under
the FLSA."
The economic realities test was applied to volunteers in Tony & Susan
Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor,6 when the Court examined
the relationship between a non-profit religious foundation and workers
receiving only food, clothing, and other non-monetary benefits.6 ' The
workers were called associates, and they were mostly addicts or
criminals the foundation took in for rehabilitation. During rehabilitation
the unpaid associates would work in businesses the foundation owned,
including grocery outlets, hog farms, and roof construction companies.
While working for the foundation, the associates were entirely dependent
on the foundation-sometimes for as long as several years. All of the
foundation's income was derived from these businesses staffed by the
unpaid associates."
Unlike the railroad brakemen trainees in Walling, the associates in
Alamo Foundation were not working as volunteers as defined in the
former Supreme Court decision.6" The Court explained that in Walling,
the brakemen worked without pay for seven to eight days under close
supervision with no expectation of compensation."o Also, the FLSA was
"not intended to stamp all persons as employees who, without any
express or implied compensation agreement, might work for their own
Because the brakemen's
advantage on the premises of another."'
employment in Walling did not consider compensation, they were more

65. See Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 729 ("[The] 'independent contractor' label does not take
the worker from the protection of the Act.").
66. 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
67. Id. at 292, 301.
68. Id. at 292-94.
69. Id. at 301-02, 306.
70. Id. at 299-300.
71. Id. at 300 (quoting Walling, 330 U.S. at 152). Compensation is an integral factor
under the economic realities test. See Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1393-94 (9th Cir.
1993) (en banc). In Hale, inmates required to work in the State's work programs were not
employees eligible for minimum hour requirements under the FLSA because the work was
a hard labor requirement for inmates, and the purpose of the work was penological, not
pecuniary. Id. at 1395, 1398; see also Coupar v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 105 F.3d 1263, 1266
(9th Cir. 1997). Although in Coupar and Hale pecuniary interests of the purported
employees were a relevant factor, in Coupar, the court concluded that the term employee
pertains to the usual employer-employee relationship, not relationships based on forced
labor. Coupar, 105 F.3d at 1266. Summarily, "the final and determinative question must
be whether ... the personnel are so dependent upon the business with which they are
connected that they come within the protection of the FLSA or are sufficiently independent
to lie outside its ambit." Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d 1308, 1311-12 (5th Cir.
1976).
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like students rather than employees.7 2 Conversely, the associates in
Alamo Foundationwere not like students, but instead depended entirely
on the foundation for long periods of time showing that the associates
expected in-kind benefits in exchange for their services." Even though
the associates considered themselves to be volunteers, and actually
protested coverage under the Act, the non-monetary benefits they
received were deemed compensation, or "wages in another form."7 4
Because the associates worked in contemplation of compensation, they
fell outside the trainee exception in Walling and, therefore, had nonwaivable FLSA protections." Importantly, the foundation's commercial
activities were in competition with other businesses; hence, allowing the
foundation to use volunteers for labor would create an advantage for the
foundation and a downward pressure on wages in the competing
businesses, an effect the FLSA was precisely intended to prevent.76
Shortly thereafter the FLSA was amended in light of the Court's
ruling in Alamo Foundation to provide that volunteers for public
agencies are not employees if they do not receive compensation and do
not perform services that regular employees are paid to perform."
Pursuant to an express grant of authority from Congress, the Secretary
of Labor defined volunteer as "[an individual who performs hours of
service for a public agency for civic, charitable, or humanitarian reasons,
without promise, expectation or receipt of compensation for services
rendered."" No amendment has been made to the FLSA, nor has the

72. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 300.
73. See id. at 293, 301 (stating that "the situation here is a far cry from that in
Portland Terminal").
74. Id. at 301-02. In order to avoid coverage of true volunteers in religious organizations, the Court explained "[tihe Act reaches only the 'ordinary commercial activities' of
religious organizations, and only those who engage in those activities in expectation of
compensation." Id. at 302 (internal citation omitted); see also 29 C.F.R. § 779.214 (2013).
75. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 299-300, 306.
76. Id. at 299, 302.
77. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, § 4, 99 Stat. 787, 790.
Section Four of the amending act provides:
(4XA) The term "employee" does not include any individual who volunteers to
perform services for a public agency which is a State, a political subdivision of a
State, or an interstate governmental agency, if (i) the individual receives no compensation or is paid expenses, reasonable
benefits, or a nominal fee to perform the services for which the individual
volunteered; and (ii) such services are not the same type of services which the
individual is employed to perform for such public agency.
Id.
78. 29 C.F.R. § 553.101(a) (2013).
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Secretary of Labor promulgated regulations allowing for volunteering in
the private for-profit sector."9
As the Court recognized in Walling, the FLSA definition of employee
extends beyond traditional agency principles.o This concept was
rehashed in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden," when
Justice Souter, writing for the Court, compared the term employee in the
Employee Retirement Security Income Act (the ERISA)" to the same
term in the FLSA.83 Before reaching the heart of the issue, the Court
reinforced a rule expressed in a prior decision:
[W]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning
under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute

otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established
meaning of these terms ....

In the past, when Congress has used the

term "employee" without defining it, we have concluded that Congress
intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as
understood by common-law agency doctrine.'
Because ERISA defines employee in a circular and meaningless fashion
as-"any individual employed by an employer"-the Court followed its
established rule by adopting a common law agency definition for the
term. 5
Justice Souter went on to discuss the FLSA definition of employee, and
how it encompasses more individuals than the ERISA term despite its
identical definition.86 Even though both statutes use the phrase, "any
individual employed by an employer," the FLSA is alone in defining
employ as "to suffer or permit to work."87 Referring to its decision in
Rutherford and the striking breadth of the FLSA term, the Court
explained: "This [] definition. . . stretches the meaning of 'employee' to

79. However, in 1998 Congress amended the FLSA again, reflecting the same principles
by excluding volunteers at private non-profit food banks working "solely for humanitarian
purposes." Amy Somers Volunteers at Food Banks Act, Pub. L. No. 105-221, § 2, 112 Stat.
1248 (1998); see also 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(5).
80. Darden, 503 U.S. at 326; see also Walling, 330 U.S. at 150-51.
81. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
82. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012).
83. Darden, 503 U.S. at 319, 325-26.
84. Id. at 322-23 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 73940 (1989)).
85. Id. at 323; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6). The Court emphasized that the common
law understanding used to define employee is not the law of any particular state, but rather
"the general common law of agency." Darden, 503 U.S. at 323 n.3 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S.
at 740).
86. Darden, 503 U.S. at 326.
87. Id.
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cover some parties who might not qualify [] under a strict application of
traditional agency law principles.""
The Court then rejected the proposition in Hearstthat employee should
be interpreted "in light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be
attained."" Justice Souter noted that Congress had responded to
Hearst by amending the NLRA term indicating that the common law
rules of agency control.o Therefore, the Court concluded the principle
of construction from Hearst should not be used where employee is not
helpfully defined." But the FLSA is different from ERISA and the
NLRA in that employ is defined broadly, illustrating that it is entitled
to a broader definition than the common law provides." It follows then
that Hearst's principle of construing employee in light of the remedial
purposes of the legislation is still viable to rectify the expansive meaning
the term has been given."
Although the FLSA covers many working relationships, as was
intended by Congress, the emergence of unpaid internships was not
accounted for when the Act was passed. Now, it must be determined
where unpaid interns fit within the FLSA definition of employee, or if
they are included within the trainee exception created in Walling.
III.

AN EMERGING LIABLITY IN UNPAID INTERNSHIPS

Employees must be paid at least the federal minimum hourly wage
and receive overtime pay for the work they perform for their employer." However, the requirements for employer-employee relationships
are sometimes improperly avoided when workers are classified as nonemployees (e.g. independent contractors or unpaid interns) despite the
individuals' actual duties and terms of the relationships reflecting those
of employees." This practice is known as misclassification and can
result in liability to the misclassified employee for back wages and

88. Id.
89. Id. at 325; see HearstPubl'ns, 322 U.S. at 124.
90. Darden, 503 U.S. at 324-25 (amending the statute to indicate that the term
employee "does not include ... any individual who, under the usual common-law rules
applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of an
independent contractor.") (emphasis omitted).
91. Id. at 325.
92. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
93. See supra note 33.
94. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a), 207(a).
95. See Solis v. A+ Nursetemps, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49595, at *4-7 (M.D. Fla.
Apr. 5, 2013).
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damages." If the misclassification is an intentional violation of known
FLSA standards or WHD rules, employers may also be liable to the
WHD for significant civil money penalties." Because internships share
similarities with employment relationships, a danger of misclassification
exists, and interns' inclusion or exclusion from the FLSA definition of
employee must be examined.

A.

The Rise of Internships

Undoubtedly internships can provide valuable benefits to students by
offering work experience in an intended career field, allowing the
participants to build their r6sum6s and become more competitive upon
entering the job market." The value of internships is statistically
apparent, as college graduates with experiential education are paid 9%
more on average." A 2010 survey by the Association of American
Colleges and Universities determined employers are in high demand for
graduates who have held internships that demonstrate an ability to
apply classroom knowledge to real world situations."'o Other benefits
of internships include gaining disciplinary skills, acquaintance with
professional practice, increased self-awareness, the opportunity to
exercise civic responsibility, and the expansion of social and professional
networks. 0 1 Nevertheless, students are taking some risks by participating in internships. Unpaid interns may not be protected by federal
workplace safety laws or states' workers compensation laws.' 02
Federal courts have also excluded unpaid interns from coverage under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,0 leaving interns vulnerable
to sexual harassment and discrimination based on race, religion, color,
sex, or national origin.104

96. See id. at *1-3, 4-7 (concluding a licensed temporary health care staffing agency
and nurse registry misclassified nurses assigned to health care providers as independent
contractors when they should have been titled as employees).
97. 29 C.F.R. § 578.3 (2013).
98. Charles Westerberg & Carol Wickershan, InternshipsHave Value, Whether orNot
Students Are Paid,CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 24,2011), https://chronicle.com/article/Internships-Have-Value/127231/.
99. David C. Yamada, The Employment Law Rights of Student Interns, 35 CoNN. L.
REV. 215, 217 (2002).
100. Westerberg, supra note 98.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.

103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2012).
104. See O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 1997).
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Legal scholars have noted a broader societal impact from unpaid
internships, which extends beyond the individual interests of the
intern.o' These proponents believe an inequality between the rich and
the poor is perpetuated by unpaid internships because students without
affluent parents to finance their education are unable to absorb the costs
of unpaid internships, while the opportunities are left to students from
wealthy families.106 The proponents assert that unpaid internships
create a sharp class divide between those who can afford to take the
opportunities and those who cannot because of the competitive edge
internships give to students and employers' demand for graduates with
work experience."' As a result, the students who cannot take unpaid
internships have less of a chance of climbing the social class ladder.'
Despite these arguments, both paid and unpaid internships have been
increasing at a significant rate.10 Only about 3% of college graduates
had internships in 1981, but by 1991 the number grew to 33%.no In
1994, 60% of graduating college seniors had held internships, and the
percentage continued to grow throughout the early 2000s.x'1 A study
conducted in 2010 by the College Employment Research Institute at
Michigan State University found that of the 10 million students enrolled
in U.S. four-year universities, approximately 75% will hold internships
at least once before graduating, while one-third of those internships will
be unpaid."' Other estimates place the percentage of unpaid internships close to 50% of all internship positions.' As of September 2013,
the percentage of graduating college students who have held internships
is the highest ever recorded." 4
Competition for post-graduation employment among college students
is the driving force behind the popularity of internships."' A growing

105. Jessica L. Curiale, America's New Glass Ceiling: Unpaid Internships, The Fair
Labor StandardsAct and The Urgent Need for Change, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1531, 1536
(2010).
106. Id.
107. Id.; Yamada, supra note 99, at 218-19.
108. Curiale, supra note 105, at 1536.
109. Greenhouse, supra note 2.
110. Yamada, supra note 99, at 217.
111. Jennifer Lee, Crucial Unpaid InternshipsIncreasingly Separate the Haves from
the Have-Nots, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2004, at A16.
112. Ross Perlin, Unpaid Interns, Complicit Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2011, at
WK11.
113. Yamada, supra note 99, at 218.
114. Victoria Stilwell, Youth for Hire Find Internships Prove Preferred Process,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-0925/youth-for-hire-finding-internship-proves-preferred-process-jobs.
115. Id.
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amount of employers are now demanding this type of experiential
education from prospective employees."16 In addition, some argue that
the increased competition is only one side of the explanation for why
internships have grown in number."' It has been asserted that
employers are specifically offering more unpaid internships for the
objective of lowering labor costs."' Ross Perlin, the author of the book
Intern Nation,"9 an expos6 on exploitative internships, describes a
significant backlash from the public against unpaid internships caused
by employers using unpaid internships as a source of free labor. 20
Many interns have filed lawsuits under federal and state employment
laws alleging this kind of exploitation, with some finding success.' 2 1
Consequentially, Perlin believes the public backlash has caused the
demand for unpaid internships to peak.122
Regardless of the trajectory of unpaid internships' the economy may
have been changed permanently.'23 Increased competition for jobs has
not subsided, and students are more aware of the advantages internships provide than ever before." Most students continue to pursue
internships for the purpose of gaining experience and building their
portfolio in order to better position themselves for entry into the job
market.'2 5 Therefore, internships are here to stay, and businesses that
wish to host such programs must understand the potential for liability
if participants are unpaid or paid less than the federal minimum hourly
rate.
B. The Federal,State, and PrivatePlaintiffs' Response to Unpaid
Internships
When internship positions are unpaid or pay less than the federal
minimum wage, companies hosting the positions face potential FLSA
116. Id.
117. Greenhouse, supra note 2.
118. Id.
119. ROSS PERLIN, INTERN NATION: How TO EARN NOTHING AND LEARN LITLE IN THE
BRAVE NEw EcONOMY (2011).

120. Josh Sanburn, The Beginningof the End of the Unpaid Internship, TIME Bus. &
MONEY (May 2, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/05/02/the-beginning-of-the-end-of-theunpaid-internship-as-we-know-it/.
121. More Unpaid Interns Sue Employers for Back Wages: Interns' Victory in Fox
Seachlight Case Highlights Employer Risk, 337 FAIR LABOR STANDARDS HANDBOOK FOR
STATES, LOCAL Gov'T & SCH. NEWSLETTER 2 (Oct. 2013).

122. Sanburn, supra note 120.
123. Stilwell, supra note 114.
124. Id.
125. State of the Internship,INTERNMATCH (May 29,2013), http://employerblog.internmatch.constate-of-the-internship-2013/.
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enforcement actions initiated by the WHD or private plaintiffs based on
misclassification.x'2
In 2010, President Obama's administration
announced its intention to crackdown on firms that pay interns
improperly. 12' Because the FLSA's minimum wage and maximum
hour provisions provide the remedy to accomplish this crackdown, the
question arises of whether unpaid interns are misclassified employees
covered by the FLSA's wage and hour protections. 2 1
The DOL weighed in on the issue by publishing Fact Sheet No. 71,129
which offers general guidance on whether interns at private for-profit
companies are subject to the minimum wage and maximum hour
3
In the DOL's view, these companies must
provisions of the FLSA."'
pay their interns minimum wage unless they meet certain criteria.''
M. Patricia Smith, the current Solicitor of Labor, reiterated in her letter
to the American Bar Association on September 12, 2013, that "[g]eneral1y, the FLSA does not permit individuals to volunteer their services to
for-profit businesses such as law firms."' 2 Fact Sheet No. 71 recognizes an exception from the general rule for unpaid interns at private forprofit companies if the following factors are present:
1. The internship, even though it includes actual operation of the
facilities of the employer, is similar to training which would be given
in an educational environment;
2. The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern;
3. The intern does not displace regular employees, but works under
close supervision of existing staff;
4. The employer that provides the training derives no immediate
advantage from the activities of the intern; and on occasion its
operations may actually be impeded;
5. The intern is not necessarily entitled to ajob at the conclusion of the
internship; and
6. The employer and the intern understand that the intern is not
entitled to wages for the time spent in the internship.'

126. Greenhouse, supra note 2; see Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 521.
127. Greenhouse, supra note 2.
128. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(eX1).
129. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR Div., FACT SHEET No. 71: INTERNSHIP
PROGRAMS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (2010).

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Letter from M. Patricia Smith, The Solicitor of Labor, U.S. Dep't of Labor (Sept.
12, 2013), availableat http-//www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaimages/news/PDF/MPSLetterreFLSA_091213.pdf.
133. Fact Sheet No. 71, supra note 129. It is unclear why the DOL describes the six
criteria as factors, yet states that the exception is met if all are met, as an elements test
requires. Presumably, the DOL deliberately called the criteria factors to avoid conflict with
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The factors in the DOL's test are derived from the Supreme Court's
decision in Walling that recognized an exception from the FLSA for
trainees. 3 4 Despite the specificity of Fact Sheet No. 71, the DOL
advises that "whether an internship or training program meets this
exclusion depends on all of the facts and circumstances of each such
program.""s Some federal courts have given differing amounts of
deference to Fact Sheet No. 71, while others have rejected the test
entirely.3 6 However, the DOL maintains the exception for unpaid
internships at private for-profit businesses is "quite" narrow due to the
broad definition of employee contained in the FLSA.x'a
Regulators at the DOL claim that many unpaid internship programs
are in violation of the FLSA, but enforcement is difficult because interns
are afraid to come forward and complain to the appropriate authorities.'
They say the pressure on interns to keep quiet creates a
chilling effect on violation reporting as the interns prefer not to be
labeled as troublemakers in their chosen career field.'3
Fearing
reprisal, interns may remain unpaid rather than risk jeopardizing the
benefits and opportunities that are implicitly included within an unpaid
internship.'4 0 In addition, some young interns are also unaware of
FLSA requirements and never file complaints or initiate litigation.14 '
Conditions are nevertheless changing as intern litigation increases and
opponents of unpaid internships become vocal, more interns will become
aware of their FLSA rights.
States have also been cracking down on exploitative unpaid internships through state labor laws.'4 2 In 2010, Oregon, California, New
York, and other states initiated investigations and fined employers
Supreme Court precedent using a flexible factors analysis when analyzing an employment
relationship. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
134. Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1025-26 (10th Cir. 1993).
135. Fact Sheet No. 71, supra note 129.
136. Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., 504 F. App'x 831,834 (11th Cir. 2013)
(noting the DOL factors are "pertinent" to the analysis); Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium
& Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting the DOL factors are "a poor method
for determining employee status in a training or educational setting"); Glatt, 293 F.R.D.
at 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (The DOL factors "are a reasonable application of [the FLSA]" and
"have support in Walling."); Xuedan Wang v. Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489, 493-94
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (The DOL factors are "a framework for an analysis of employee-employer
relationship.").
137. Fact Sheet No. 71, supra note 129.
138. Greenhouse, supra note 2.
139. Id.
140. Yamada, supra note 99, at 232.
141. Id.
142. Greenhouse, supra note 2.
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operating illegal unpaid or underpaid internship programs. 143 A
spokesperson for the Oregon Labor Board commented that some of the
illegal unpaid internships found during the investigations had unsupervised interns displacing regular employees.'" In one instance, a
company producing solar panels in Oregon was ordered to pay $3,350 in
back wages to two individuals for violations of the state's labor laws.145
Oregon has taken action by passing legislation that includes interns
under the class of individuals protected by the State's anti-employment
discrimination and sexual harassment statutes. 4 1 California responded to the DOL's step-up in enforcement by releasing its own revised
guidelines to employers, advising when interns must be paid under state
law.147
A major tool for widespread enforcement, beyond the capability of
federal or state government, is the private right of action under the
FLSA by which employees can sue their employers for FLSA violations."
There have been sixteen lawsuits under the FLSA's private
right of action arising from internship programs, many of which are still
pending.14
Section 216(b) of the FLSA states that employers who
violate the minimum wage or maximum hour provisions of the Act are
directly liable to their affected employees for unpaid wages due.'
Employees may file a lawsuit in any federal court with jurisdiction to
recover from their employers not only back wages, but also reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs of the action.'
Plaintiff-employees may sue
on their own behalf and on the behalf of other similarly situated
employees. 5 2 Class actions are prohibited and collective actions are
used as a substitute.5 3 A class action lawsuit requires plaintiffs to
opt-out of a lawsuit to preserve their claim, but collective actions differ
in that they require plaintiffs to opt-in to pursue a FLSA claim if they
are similarly situated with the original plaintiff.'5 4 Collective enforce-

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. H.B. 2669, 77th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013) (amending OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659A.001 (2008)).
147. Steven Greenhouse, CaliforniaLabor Dept. Revises Guidelines on When Interns
Must be Paid,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2010, at B2.
148. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
149. Suen, supra note 3.
150. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 29 C.F.R. § 790.20 (2013).
154. David Borgen & Laura L. Ho, The FairLabor StandardsAct: Litigation of Wage
and Hour Collective Actions under the FairLabor StandardsAct, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMPLOY.
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ment actions have become increasingly popular, as the potential for large
judgments is greater than individual FLSA actions, and attorneys
eagerly take the cases because of the attorneys' fees provision in the
Act. 55
New York's federal district courts have become a focal point for FLSA
litigation under the private right of action.'56 Over the course of the
last two years, many lawsuits arising from internships have been filed
in the state.'5 ' The law firm of Outten & Golden has played a major
rile, suing the Hearst Corporation and Fox Entertainment Group on
behalf of former unpaid interns.' In Glatt v. Fox SearchlightPictures
Inc., the firm obtained a momentous decision from the Southern District
of New York, holding that two interns working on the production of the
movie Black Swan were employees as defined by the FLSA.'59
C. Intern and rainee Litigation
Employers defending FLSA lawsuits arising out of unpaid internship
programs have translated the trainee exception from Walling to apply
to interns.160 This defense has been generally successful outside the
Southern District of New York, but blatantly exploitative internships,
similar to the internships in Glatt, may be found illegal even in these
other jurisdictions.161
1. Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc. A few months
prior to the Glatt decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed two cases from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida, holding that two unpaid
externs were not employees under the FLSA.'6 2 In Kaplan v. Code
Blue Billing & Coding, Inc.,1 the pair of externs separately filed their

POL'Y J. 129, 130-31(2003) (contrasting class action lawsuits and FLSA collective actions).
155. See Lawrence E. Dube, Lawyers Discuss FLSA Developments, Increasing
Popularityof Collective Actions, 232 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Dec. 3 2008, at A8.
156. See Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 521-22; Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 490.
157. Susan Adams, Is the Unpaid Internship Dead?, FORBES (June 14, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2013/06/14/is-the-unpaid-internship-dead/.
158. Id.
159. See Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 522, 538-39.

160. See discussion infra Part Ill.C.1-3.
161. Id.
162. Kaplan, 504 F. App'x at 832-34.
163. 504 F. App'x 831 (11th Cir. 2013) (unpublished).
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complaints in the same district court claiming they were due back wages
for unpaid externships at two for-profit businesses.'"
The first unpaid extern case decided by the district court was also

titled Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Consulting, Inc.'

In Kaplan,

the extern was a student at a vocational school in a medical billing and
coding specialist program who was required to complete an unpaid
externship before graduating. The student's externship with the
defendant medical billing and consulting company fulfilled this
requirement.'e To answer the question of whether the extern was an
FLSA employee, the district court used the DOL six-factor test from Fact
Sheet No. 71.167
The district court concluded that the externship satisfied all six of the
factors and determined that the extern's relationship with the for-profit
company was not, as a matter of economic realities, the employeremployee type.'68 Work activities the extern performed included
checking the status of insurance claims and filing Medicare and
insurance remittances.169 Although the district court found these
activities were not as comprehensive as the course material the extern
studied at the vocational school, the district court found the first
factor-that the work the extern did was similar to what she would
Because the student received
learn in a classroom-was satisfied.'
college credit for the externship, the district court found that the second
factor was satisfied and the externship was for the benefit of the
extern.17 1 On the third factor, the district court used a two-prong
analysis: whether the extern displaced regular employees; and whether
the extern worked under the company's close supervision.172 According
to the district court, the extern was not replacing regular employees
because another paid employee was double checking the extern's work,
and the extern understood she would not be hired.1a The second
prong was also met because the owner of the company closely supervised

164. Id. at 835. No relevant difference exists between interns and externs for purposes
of this Article.
165. 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185696 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2012).
166. Id. at *3.
167. Id. at *10-18.
168. Id.
169. Id. at *12.
170. Id. at *11-12.
171. Id. at *12-13. According to a 2004 DOL opinion letter, "when a student receives
college credit for an externship, it inures to the benefit of the student." Id. at *12 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
172. Id. at *13.
173. Id. at *13-14.
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the extern's phone calls to insurance companies, discussed issues that
arose during the calls, and answered any questions from the extern."'
Physical proximity supported finding that the extern was closely
supervised because the owner/supervisor was always in the building
with her office door open and accessible to the extern. 7 s Under the
fourth factor, the company received no immediate benefits from the
extern's work, but instead the extern impeded business activities.'
Last, the fifth and six factors were met because the extern understood
she would not be entitled to a job and would not be paid."'
The second case considered on appeal from the Southern District of
Florida involved another extern from the same vocational school at a
different private for-profit company."' In O'Neill v. East FloridaEye
Institute, P.A.,179 the extern was similarly required to complete an
unpaid externship before graduation.8 o During the externship the
extern expected to learn skills related to her vocational school course
work and apply the knowledge from the coursework to externship
activities. Almost all of the extern's time was spent on work activities
related to her studies at the vocational school. At no point did the extern
discuss wages with the company.'
In its analysis, the district court applied the economic realities test
from Goldberg and determined that the extern was not an employee. 82
First, the district court contrasted the case before it from cases
distinguishing between hired employees and independent contractors."a In the employee-independent contractor cases, "compensation
was contemplated as the central basis for [the] relationships."" The

174. Id.
175. Id. at *14.
176. Id. at *15. The owner described having four of the externs at one point to be "very
overwhelming." Id.
177. Id. at *16-17.
178. O'Neill v. E. Fla. Eye Inst., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185699, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr.
17, 2012).
179. 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185699, (S.D. Fla. Apr. 16, 2012).
180. Id. at *2.
181. Id.
182. Id. at *3-4. Without an explanation, the same district court used a different test.
Id. The opinions were written by different judges (Judge Middlebrooks in Kaplan, and
Judge Graham in O'Neill), indicating that the judges had differing views on the deference
due to the DOL factors. Id.; Kaplan, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185690, at *1.
183. O'Neill, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185699, at *5-6.
184. Id. at *5. The district court's reasoning for why the extern was not an employee
parallels that of the Second Circuit's in O'Connor v. Davis, which decided that unpaid
interns who do not receive compensation cannot be hired parties, and, therefore, cannot be
employees within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 126 F.3d at 115-
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district court went on to find that the extern's relationship with the
alleged employer never contemplated compensation, and the extern
never complained about being unpaid; therefore, her allegation of an
Also
employment relationship was inconsistent with the facts."a
relevant was that the company received very little benefit from the
extern's work.'8 The paid employees supervising the extern normally
would perform the same work, review the externs work, provide
feedback, and answer questions."8 ' No employees were displaced
because the extern did not "lighten the work load" for any paid
employees." The district court recognized that the company partnered with the extern's school to help the students by providing them with
an educational experience when they had no marketable skills, before
going on to hold that the extern was not an employee entitled to
minimum wages under the FLSA.x's
In the consolidated case, the Eleventh Circuit applied the economic
realities test, which considered the economic benefits conferred to the
companies hosting the externships.19 0 Citing Walling, the court of
appeals held individuals who work for their own advantage, or whose
work provides no immediate advantage for the alleged employer, are
The court of appeals
exempt from the definition of employee.''
stressed that the externs' work was for their own advantage because
they earned academic credit and it was required for their degrees.'
Also, the district court's findings that the externships impeded the
companies' businesses showed the companies took no immediate
advantage from the relationship, and thus the externs were not the
companies' employees.'
As an afterthought, DOL Fact Sheet No. 71
was given some deference, although the court of appeals noted the six-

16 (2d Cir. 1997).
185. O'Neill, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185699, at *5-7.
186. Id. at *7.
187. Id. at *7-8.
188. Id. at *7.
189. Id.
190. Kaplan, 504 F. App'x at 834.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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factor test was not controlling.19 4 Still, both of the externships met all
six DOL factors, and the district court decisions were affirmed.195
2. Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & School, Inc. Unlike the
Eleventh Circuit, the Sixth Circuit in Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium
& School, Inc." adopted a primary benefits test and rejected the
DOL's test."' In Laurelbrook, the Secretary of Labor filed a FLSA
enforcement action against a non-profit vocational school seeking to
enjoin the school from requiring its minor students to work without pay
in a nursing home (the sanitarium) owned by the school and located on
its premises. Half of the students' day would be spent in the classroom,
while the other half would be spent working in the sanitarium gaining
practical skills and learning the dignity of manual labor. The district
court found that the sanitarium staff members would be able to provide
the same services if the students were prohibited from working. But
because the sanitarium was an integral part of the school's vocational
training program, the sanitarium would not exist without the student
workers. The district court found students received important tangible
benefits from the vocational training, and any benefits the school
received from operating the sanitarium were far outweighed by the
benefits to the students. Since the students received the primary
benefits from their own work, the trial court found the students were not
employees. 11
The Sixth Circuit expressed how precise tests are inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's economic realities test, which considers all of the
surrounding circumstances on a case-by-case basis."' According to the
court, the DOL's test was too rigid and inconsistent with the required
totality of the circumstances analysis because it mandated all six factors
be met.200 Also, the court noted the DOL test was inconsistent with
Walling and prior DOL interpretations, causing the test to lose all
persuasive force.20' The court instead preferred tests "where no one

194. Id. at 834-35 ("The rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator
under [the FLSA], while not controlling upon courts by reason of their authority, do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort to for guidance." Id. (quoting Dade Cnty. v. Alvarez, 124 F.3d 1380, 1385
(11th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original)).
195. Id. at 835.
196. 642 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2011).
197. Id. at 523-24.
198. Id. at 519-22.
199. Id. at 522.
200. Id. at 525.
201. Id.
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factor (or the absence of one factor) controls," while rejecting categorical
tests that "determin[e] employee status by reference to labels used by
the parties."202
Pursuant to the court's understanding of Walling, "the ultimate
inquiry in a learning or training situation is whether the employee is the
primary beneficiary of the work performed."2 03 Important factors to
consider are if the relationship displaces regular employees and the
The test is admittedly broad, but
relationship's educational value.'
since it focuses on the benefits flowing to each party, the test expresses
the FLSA's distinction between trainees and employees made in
Walling.205 To that end, where students are used for essential funetions of an employer's operation in place of regular employees, without
gaining significant education, an immediate economic benefit is passed
to the employer, and the students should be classified as FLSA
employees.206 The court also concluded that analyzing the primary
benefits of a working relationship is consistent with the remedial
purposes of the FLSA-to prevent the displacement of paid employees
and the exploitation of labor.207
Accepting the district court's factual findings and legal conclusions, the
Sixth Circuit held that the students primarily benefited from their work
at the sanitarium.208 Although the sanitarium received payment for
services it provided to patients through the unpaid students, the value
of the free labor to the school was offset in three separate ways: (1) the
students did not displace paid workers in part because the sanitarium
could continue to operate without the students; (2) some of the paid
workers had to supervise the students, which reduced the supervisor's
overall productivity for the nursing home; and (3) the school did not
receive an unfair advantage from the unpaid labor as the school was not
in competition with other institutions for labor.20 ' For the students,
tangible benefits like learning how to use hand tools, and intangible
benefits such as responsibility and the dignity of manual labor were

202. Id. at 524, 525. It would therefore be incorrect to conclude students were not
employees simply because they are in a vocational school, as this ignores the economic
realities of the relationship. Id. at 524.
203. Id. at 525-26.
204. Id. at 529.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 527-28; see also Marshall v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 668 F.2d 234, 235 (6th Cir.
1981).
207. Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 527.
208. Id. at 532.
209. Id. at 530-31. The court also noted that the revenue from the nursing home's
operations was invested back into the school. Id. at 530.
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enough to tip the primary benefits scale in favor of the students,
excluding them from FLSA coverage. 210
3. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures. In June of 2013, the
Southern District of New York held in Glatt v. Fox SearchlightPictures
that two unpaid interns were legally required to be paid minimum
wage.2 n In Glatt, two interns who had worked on the set of the film
Black Swan brought a lawsuit under the FLSA against Fox Searchlight
Pictures Inc. (Searchlight) claiming they were improperly classified as
interns instead of paid employees.212 Upon granting in part the
plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment, the court determined that
Searchlight was the employer of the two interns, and the interns were
employees within the meaning of the FLSA. 1 s
The court first rehashed the trainee exception from Walling.2 14
Emphasis was placed on the Supreme Court's determination in Walling
that the alleged employer received no "immediate advantage" from the
work performed by the trainees. 215 Searchlight presented the primary
benefits test as the appropriate standard, arguing that if "the internship's benefits to the intern outweigh the benefits to the engaging entity"
the trainee exception will apply.2 1 6 However, the court rejected the
primary benefits test as too subjective, claiming the test depends on the
amount of benefits an individual intern derives from an internship.1
In the court's view, employers would not be able to predict how much an
intern will benefit from an internship, and cannot know in advance if
they need to pay their interns.21 8 Instead, the court gave deference to
the DOL factors found in Fact Sheet No. 71., but noted that "[no single
factor is controlling," and that the correct view considers the totality of
the circumstances.2 19
Under the first DOL factor, the court found that the internships did
not offer training similar to an educational environment, and the interns
received nothing beyond on-the-job training that other paid employees
received.2 20 The amount an intern actually learns was not relevant to

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 531-32.
Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 534.
Id. at 521-22.
Id. at 529, 534.
Id. at 530-31.
Id. (quoting Walling, 330 U.S. at 153).
Id. at 531.
Id. at 532.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 532-33.
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the inquiry under the first factor.221 Both interns received no formal
training, education, or "skills that are fungible within the industry."22 2
Learning to use the photocopier and coffee machine or how a fim
production office functions were not deemed sufficiently fungible
skills. 2 ' Therefore, the court concluded the first factor weighed in
favor of finding an employment relationship. 4
The second factor, which considers if the internship is for the benefit
of the intern, also weighed in favor of finding employment. 2 25 Al
though the interns received r~sum6 listings, job references, and learned
how a film production office works, the court found these benefits
incidental to working in the office and were shared by other paid
workers.2 26 Because the internships were not structured for the
benefit of the interns and Searchlight was benefited by their work, which
normally would be performed by paid workers, the court found liability
on the second factor. 27
Third, whether the interns displaced regular employees was answered
As stated by the
by examining the nature of the interns' work.2
the category of
fall
within
normally
court, administrative work will
In
this case, the
would
perform."'
activities that a regular employee
interns were running errands, answering phones, making photocopies,
organizing file cabinets, and taking lunch orders.2 30 Even one intern's
supervisor admitted that the work would otherwise be done by a paid
employee.231 Accordingly, the court found the third factor to weigh in
favor of FLSA coverage.12
Fourth, Searchlight did not dispute that it received an immediate
advantage from the interns' work.233 According to the court, the
interns' work was menial but otherwise essential to the film's production
and not an impediment to the progression of the film. 2 ' Next, the
court found no evidence the interns were entitled to a job at the end of

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id.
Id. (quoting Reich, 992 F.2d at 1028) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 533.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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their internship, and thus, the fifth DOL factor weighed against finding
that the interns were employees.235 Last, even though both Searchlight and the interns understood the internships were unpaid, the court
gave little weight to the sixth factor." The Supreme Court in Alamo
Foundationreasoned that workers cannot waive their FLSA protections
by claiming to do work voluntarily; otherwise, such an exception would
allow employers to use their greater bargaining power to coerce
employees into testifying that they voluntarily performed uncompensated
work.237 For these reasons, the sixth factor was given little, if any,
weight." After reiterating the administrative nature of the interns'
work and the immediate advantages to Searchlight, the court held the
interns were improperly classified as unpaid interns and were FLSA
employees entitled to minimum wage.2 39
Succeeding the decision in Glatt, a number of lawsuits were filed
alleging violations of state and federal wage and hour laws arising from
unpaid internships, many of which are still pending.24 0 In addition to
finding two interns were actually employees, the district court in Glatt
also certified a collective action for other interns whose FLSA claims
were not resolved on summary judgment. 241 The certification of
collective actions showed courts were willing to allow large scale pursuit
of unpaid internship claims against employers, which caught the interest
of attorneys and contributed to the increase in litigation.24 2 The
success of some of these lawsuits further entices plaintiffs since some
employers have entered into settlement agreements with their past
interns. 243 At least one other decision finding a misclassified unpaid
intern has come out of the Southern District of New York," but
despite the majority of the litigation being concentrated in this district,

235. Id. at 534.
236. Id.
237. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 302.
238. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 534.
239. Id.
240. See More Unpaid Interns Sue Employers for Back Wages, supra note 121.
241. Glatt,293 F.R.D. at 538; see also Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 121964, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2013) (limiting the time period of the collective
action).
242. Amanda L. Shelby, High-ProfileClassActionsIllustrateIntern Risk, 22 No. 10 Ind.
Emp't Law Letter 1 (2012).
243. More Unpaid InternsSue Employers for Back Wages, supra note 121.
244. See Alladin v. Paramount Mgmt., LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121949, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2013) (finding an unpaid intern was a misclassified employee under the
FLSA).
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intern cases have been, and will continue to be, filed in other regions.2
IV.

COMPLYING WITH THE FLSA

The significant increase in the amount of lawsuits against companies
stemming from their internship programs is no small matter. Many
attorneys representing employers are now advising their clients to
discontinue their internship programs or pay their interns minimum
wage?' Justifiably so, as the decision in Glatt has seemed to open the
door to many more intern lawsuits.247 The private right of action and
collective action provisions in the FLSA create a huge potential for
unpaid internship litigation and have thus been the vehicle used by the
recent claims.2 48 Despite this new litigation, the unpaid internship in
the private for-profit sector is not completely without recourse to
survive.249 Courts have found unpaid interns are not employees within
meaning of the FLSA under certain circumstances, but before summarizing how unpaid internships should be structured to avoid FLSA
lawsuits, a precedent issue must be addressed.
A. Applying the FLSA to Unpaid Internships and Consistency with
the Act's Remedial Objectives
Although some scholars reason that unpaid internships are a societal
problem widening the class divide between rich and poor,250 the
reasoning that unpaid internships are creating unequal opportunities
ignores the availability of school stipends and student loans for academic
credit, which allow all students to take advantage of unpaid internships
regardless of their financial backing. Statistical analysis has also
disproven the contention that unpaid internships are unequally utilized
by the rich, but rather shows that higher income students are more
engaged in internships regardless of whether they are paid or un-

245. See, e.g., Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81100, at
*8 (M.D. Fla. Jun. 10, 2013). Schumann is another unfavorable outcome for an unpaid
intern; however, it shows that plaintiffs in the Eleventh Circuit are not deterred by the
dismissal in Kaplan. See id.
246. Adams, supra note 157; see also Unpaid Interns Get ConditionalCertification in
High-Profile Wage and Hour Case, 324 FAiR LABOR STANDARDS HANDBOOK FOR STATES,
LocAL Gov'T & SCH. NEWSLETTER 6 (Sept. 2012).
247. More Unpaid Interns Sue Employers for Back Wages, supra note 121.
248. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
249. Adams, supra note 157.
250. Curiale, supra note 105, at 1560; Yamada, supra note 99, at 218-19.
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paid.2"'
Even if the opportunities are difficult for underfinanced
students to obtain, arguing against all unpaid internships ignores the
stated remedial objectives of the FLSA and is more likely driven by an
inner need to change the status quo based on misplaced humanitarianism.2 Congress passed the provisions of the Act with the purpose of
preventing long unhealthy hours, the use of sub-standard wages, and
unfair competition.'
The FLSA is intended to ensure workers who
rely on their jobs for financial support are still able to buy the bare
necessities of life.254 Uncompensated interns cannot reasonably expect
to rely on their internships for financial support and are not subject to
the same pressures as hired parties.2 55 Therefore, applying the FLSA
to educational internships with no expectation of compensation takes the
Act beyond its intended purposes.25 6 If, however, employers receive
immediate economic benefits from the use of unpaid internships, the
FLSA's remedial objectives are contravened by the unfair competitive
advantage free labor provides.257 The Supreme Court has held that
the term employee should be interpreted in light of the legislation's
remedial objectives to address the problems Congress sought to fix. 25 8
Here, where a student is working part-time hours, gaining fungible
skills, and is well supervised, coverage under the FLSA is improper.
With this in mind, firms that wish to host internship programs should
tailor them to comply with court interpretations of FLSA coverage in
their federal jurisdiction. Importantly, employers must understand
whether the jurisdictions in which they are subject to suit follow the
DOL's test in Fact Sheet No. 71. Because this test is stricter than the
economic realities test or the primary benefits test, employers in these
jurisdictions must take extra care.

251. PHIL GARDNER, INTERN BRIDGE, INC., THE DEBATE OVER UNPAID COLLEGE
INTERNSHIPS (2010).

Our findings do not support the common contention that students from the
wealthiest families have greater access to unpaid internships, even among most
for-profit companies. We also learned that high income students appear more
likely to be engaged in internships, regardless if they are paid or unpaid, with forprofit companies, and that they have very low participation in internships with
non-profits organizations and government agencies.
Id.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

See 29 U.S.C. § 202(a); Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. at 361.
29 U.S.C. § 202(a).
Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. at 361.
O'Connor, 126 F.3d at 115-16 (applying Title VII to unpaid internships).
See Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 300.
Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 531.
See Silk, 331 U.S. at 713; Hearst, 322 U.S. at 123-24.
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B. Deference Afforded to the DOL Test
Certainly, guidance from the DOL on whether an intern is a FLSA
employee must be considered, but depending on the jurisdiction, the
DOL's six-factor test may not be the same analysis a court would
use.259 Rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor
pursuant to an express congressional grant of power in the FLSA have
the force of law and are given controlling weight.2 60 However, Fact
Sheet No. 71 is not a rule or regulation, but an opinion letter.26 ' Thus,
the strict DOL test is not controlling and does not bind a court's
judgment by reason of its authority.262
Despite the lack of control opinion letters have over courts, the DOL
factors contained in Fact Sheet No. 71 are entitled to some deference
based on the DOL's unique status as the agency charged with administering the FLSA, its specialized experience from enforcement, and its
knowledge acquired through investigations.2 63 To that end, the

Supreme Court recognized in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 26 4 that agency
opinion letters "do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."265 The weight assigned to an agency opinion depends on "the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.""'
Fact Sheet No. 71 is regarded by some courts as a reasonable
Federal
interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Walling.
courts have already given deference to the DOL test and the factors in
different jurisdictions.268 Each of the factors can directly be identified
in the facts of Walling.269 Accordingly, both the Eleventh Circuit and
259. See supra note 136.
260. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
261. Kaplan, 504 F. App'x at 834-35.
262. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137-38, 140 (1944); Reich, 992 F.2d at
1026.
263. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001).
264. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
265. Id. at 140.
266. Id.
267. Kaplan, 504 F. App'x at 834-35.
268. See id.; Atkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 701 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir. 1983)
(concluding the test is "entitled to substantial deference"); Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
686 F.2d 267, 273 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying the six DOL factors after using the primary
benefits test); Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 532; Archie v. Grand Cent. Pship, Inc., 997 F. Supp.
504, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
269. Reich, 992 F.2d at 1025-26.
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the Southern District of New York have determined that the DOL test
is a reasonable application of the trainee exception.7 o An additional
consideration tending to show courts' future preference for the DOL
factors is that the enforcement standard has been consistently applied
to employer training programs for decades.27 ' Even though Fact Sheet
No. 71 was published in 2010, the same six factors have been used in
DOL opinion letters going back to at least 1967.272 The Supreme
Court has repeated that "when there has been a long acquiescence in a
regulation, and by it rights of parties for many years have been
determined and adjusted, it is not to be disregarded without the most
cogent and persuasive reasons."2 73 Although Fact Sheet No. 71 is not
a regulation, businesses attempting to comply with the FLSA have likely
relied on these standards. They provide definite guidelines for
businesses ensuring that they will not be subject to FLSA liability for
their unpaid internship programs. By utilizing a clear standard rather
than the vague primary benefits-balancing analysis, businesses will be
more inclined to host internships, and therefore, courts should be
reluctant to depart from these factors.
On the other hand, for employers only subject to suit in the Sixth
Circuit, the DOL test should be given very little consideration when
formulating an internship program.274 In Laurelbrook, the Sixth
Circuit explicitly rejected the test by claiming it is too rigid, and instead
opted for a totality of the circumstances approach that considers the
primary benefits of the working relationship.27 5 The Fourth Circuit in
McLaughlin v. Ensley276 and the Eighth Circuit in Blair v. WillS277
also followed the primary benefits test.2 78 However, these decisions
were before Fact Sheet No. 71 was officially published in 2010; therefore,

270. Kaplan, 504 F. App'x at 834-35; Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 532.
271. See Reich, 992 F.2d at 1027.
272. Id.
273. Robertson v. Downing, 127 U.S. 607,613 (1888); accord Helvering v. Griffiths, 318
U.S. 371, 403 (1943).
274. See Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 525.
275. Id. ("[Tihe ultimate inquiry in a learning or training situation is whether the
employee is the primary beneficiary of the work performed.").
276. 877 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989).
277. 420 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2005).
278. Id. at 829 (finding student's chores for a school were not employment under the
FLSA because they were primarily for the student's benefit providing the student with "a
sense of teamwork, responsibility, accomplishment, and pride"); Ensely, 877 F.2d at 1209
("[Tihe general test used to determine if an employee is entitled to the protections of the
Act is whether the employee or the employer is the primary beneficiary of the trainees'
labor.").

2014]

MANAGING FLSA EXPOSURE

1161

it is possible that future decisions in the Fourth and Eighth Circuits will
consider the DOL test.
In other circuits, the DOL factors are considered relevant, but courts
differ on whether they are entitled to controlling weight.'
The Fifth
Circuit applied the primary benefits test in Donovan v. American
Airlines Inc.,"so although the same court later afforded substantial
deference to the DOL factors in Atkins v. General Motors Corp.21 For
the Tenth Circuit, the DOL factors are weighty, but are applied with a
slight variation from the test proposed by the DOL.282 According to
the Solicitor of Labor, all of the DOL factors must be present for an
unpaid internship program to qualify for the exception.m Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit concluded in Reich v. Parker Fire Protection
District' that the factors are "relevant but not conclusive," and
requiring all of the DOL factors to be present is "unreasonable."m
The Eleventh Circuit in Kaplan applied its own economic realities test
and then applied the DOL factors, concluding the factors are entitled to
deference.28 6 Last, the Second Circuit also applied the economic
realities test, but it has not passed judgment on the viability of the DOL
factors in the context of an unpaid internship.8
Because the DOL test mirrors the facts from Walling, and some courts
have given the test deference, employers should be cautious and assume
courts will apply the factors, unless there is precedent rejecting the test.

279. See Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 524.
280. 686 F.2d 267, 271-72 (5th Cir. 1982). In Donovan, the Fifth Circuit approved of
the district court's method of analyzing the "relative benefits flowing to trainee and
company during the training period." Id. at 271. The Fifth Circuit supported a primary
benefits test that requires the balancing of benefits. Id. at 272. However, after applying
the primary benefits test the court went on to briefly apply the same six DOL factors,
coming to the same conclusion as under the former test: "Furthermore, the Wage and Hour
Administrator's interpretation ofPortlandTerminal supports the district court's conclusion.
The Administrator has formulated a six-item list designed to answer the question whether
trainees are employees within the meaning of the FLSA. The trainees here are not
employees by each of those criteria. . . ." Id. at 273.

281. 701 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir. 1983).
282. See Reich, 992 F.2d at 1027.
283. Smith, supra note 132. In the Solicitor's letter to the American Bar Association
she explained: "The FLSA does, however, permit individuals to participate in unpaid
internships or training programs conducted by for-profit entities if certain criteria are met."
Id.
284. 992 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1993).
285. Id. at 1026-27.
286. Kaplan, 504 F. App'x at 834-35.
287. See Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 2003).
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How Employers can Comply with FLSA Standards

Regardless of whether a court will apply the DOL standard or some
other test, all unpaid internship programs in the private for-profit sector
should have certain characteristics. The presence of these traits will
help ensure that employers will not be exposing themselves to FLSA
claims for back wages and damages.
1. Unpaid Internships Should be for Students Receiving
Academic Credit. Two of the relevant cases where employers had no
requirement to pay interns or volunteers involved situations with
enrolled students.2 88 A clear inference can be made that an internship
is for the benefit and education of its interns when all participants are
students.2 89 Further, the student interns should be gaining an educational benefit from the internship similar to what the student would
learn in a classroom. 9 o Only the DOL test requires this component in
internships, but if employers want to minimize their risk they should
only include students taking college, graduate, or vocational courses
related to the employers' businesses.
Not only should employers exclude non-students from their internships, employers should also require their interns certify they are
receiving academic credit from their school."' When an intern is
receiving academic credit, the primary benefits of the relationship more
clearly flow to the intern.2 92 Employers hosting internship programs
are advised to be in communication with the schools where the interns
attend. This allows the schools to affirm the educational value of the
internships, to monitor the internship for compliance, and to give the
appearance of propriety if a lawsuit is ever threatened.293
Unpaid interns should understand that they are not entitled to wages
for the work they do.294 Additionally, employers should confirm the
interns will not be entitled to a job at the completion of their internship
to prevent any coercive pressure on the interns to do extra work which
benefits the employer in the hopes of future employment.295 Therefore,
288. See Kaplan, 504 F. App'x at 832-33; Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 520. The interns in
Kaplan and Laurelbrookwere students at vocational schools. Kaplan, 504 F. App'x at 83233; Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 520.
289. Kaplan, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185696, at *7.
290. Fact Sheet No. 71, supra note 129.
291. See Smith, supra note 132.
292. See O'Neill, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185699, at *8.
293. See Smith, supra note 132.
294. See Fact Sheet No. 71, supra note 129.
295. See Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 302.
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employers should have their interns sign documents acknowledging that
the interns are not entitled to wages for the work they complete during
their internships, and that they will not be entitled to employment.
2. Internship Programs Should Teach Interns Transferrable
Skills. Skills must be taught during the course of unpaid internships
that are fungible, or transferrable to other companies and positions
within the employer's industry.9 6 Courts have supported this fungible
skills requirement because it illustrates that internships are for the
benefit of the participants."' Conversely, an internship will not be
sufficiently beneficial for unpaid interns just because the interns receive
r6sum6 listings and job references. 298 Companies hosting unpaid
internships must provide interns with something beyond on-the-job
training that regular paid employees would normally experience.2 99
Learning how to work office equipment is not considered a fungible skill
that satisfies the requirement.oo On the other hand, transferrable
skills like medical billing are satisfactory because they make a person
attractive to employers in a related industry.ao' Under the primary
benefits test, a more liberal application of the fungible skills requirement
may be used because of the benefit balancing analysis.302 For example,
less complex skills like learning how to use hand tools, and intangible
skills like responsibility and the value of hard work can be sufficiently
beneficial to interns if economic advantages to an employer are
offset."
In all jurisdictions, employers should not worry about how
much an intern actually learns, but rather should focus on what
education is offered.3 04 The best approach is comprised of a wellstructured internship schedule with weekly training meetings demonstrating that steps have been taken to plan for a beneficial experience
for the interns.
3. Internship Programs Cannot Give an Economic Advantage
to Companies. A major mistake employers can make is viewing

296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
12.
302.
303.
304.

Reich, 992 F.2d at 1028.
See id.; Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 532.
See Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 533.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 532-33.
See Kaplan, 504 F. App'x at 834; Kaplan, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185696, at *11Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 531.
Id.
Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 533.
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interns as unpaid labor to address excess workloads."o' Internships
that serve this purpose clearly would fly in the face of the remedial
purposes of the FLSA to prevent unfair competition and the exploitation
of workers. 306 Employers must instead view unpaid interns as tag0
alongs, shadowing the paid workforce, but not replacing them.ao
The
best way to ensure that an unpaid internship program does not unfairly
advantage the hosting employer is by using regular paid employees to
closely supervise the interns. This will offset unfairly obtained
advantages to the company gained from the unpaid labor.308 Supervisors should be in close physical proximity, and readily available to the
interns so they can answer the interns' questions promptly.30 9 Work
products should be reviewed, and supervisors should give the interns
feedback and an opportunity to ask questions.3 o If regular employees
are foregoing normal work activities to supervise interns or redo interns'
work, the internship will typically be viewed as an impediment to the
employer rather than an immediate advantage.
Employers cannot hire interns to cut costs because utilizing unpaid
labor for tasks that would normally be performed by paid employees
constitutes unfair competition.3 12 Therefore, interns should not be
replacing regular paid employees and should not be performing work
that employees would normally complete.1 3 Administrative work is
generally viewed as appropriate for only regular employees because it
imparts little if any fungible skills to interns.1 However, it may be
permissible for an intern to do the same work performed by regular
employees, including administrative or menial work, if the economic
benefits to the employer are significantly offset.315 Circuits that apply
the primary benefits test (Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth) may allow
this type of work where the balance of the benefits favors the in-

305.

Shelby, supra note 242.

306. See 29 U.S.C. § 202(a).
307. Shelby, supra note 242.
308. See Kaplan, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185696, at *14.
309. See id.
310. See id.
311. See Atkins, 701 F.2d at 1128-29; O'Neill, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185699, at *7;
Kaplan, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185696, at *16.
312. See Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 527.
313. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 533.
314. Id.
315. Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 530-31.
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terns.3 16 Close supervision is key in these situations in order to offset
economic benefits to the employer."
The duration of an internship program is also relevant to the
advantages derived from the working relationship.3 18 Programs should
last for a shorter period of time to appear more temporary in nature and
mirror an academic schedule. 1 ' During long internships, participants
presumably gain more skills and training, increasing the value of their
work products. Shorter internships would not allow for such accruals of
value. A typical internship length is ten weeks, but depending on the
other aspects of the internship, an acceptable duration could be up to
one academic year. Full-time hours should be avoided and flexible parttime schedules should be utilized in order to avoid similarity to regular
employees."o Plainly, where internships are functionally the same as
typical employment, courts will find employment.
V.

CONCLUSION

Unpaid internships are, as a whole, not socially harmful. Rather, it
depends on the circumstances of each individual program. It has been
shown that unpaid internships can exist without contravening the
purposes of the FLSA. Unfair competition and exploitation are certainly
possible consequences of an improperly structured unpaid internship, but
if a company creates a learning experience for a student in good-faith,
it is hard to see a societal harm.
The right to freely determine the terms of employment contracts
promoted in Lochner has certainly been outweighed by a public policy
against abusive and exploitative labor conditions. Minimum wage and
maximum hour laws help equalize the bargaining power differential
between employers and employees, and therefore any loopholes are to
the disadvantage of the entire workforce. The Supreme Court adopted
a broad approach when applying the FLSA that considers all of the
circumstances of a working relationship to ensure the remedial
legislation would be as effective as Congress intended. The DOL's
exacting test in Fact Sheet No. 71 has its benefits for businesses looking
to ensure they will not be liable to future unpaid interns for back wages.
Despite the solid reasoning and policy implications behind the selected

316. Id.
317. Id.; Walling, 330 U.S. at 149-50.
318. See Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 301.
319. Shelby, supra note 242.
320. See Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 729 ("Where the work done, in its essence, follows the
usual path of an employee, putting on [a non-employee] label does not take the worker
from the protection of the Act.").
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DOL factors, this all-or-nothing test does not conform nicely to the
Supreme Court's flexible economic realities test. Federal courts must
agree as they have consistently ignored or rejected the all-or-nothing
approach the DOL offers. Cases like Kaplan and Glatt are good
examples for employers around the country to look to when planning the
structure of their unpaid internship programs. Representing both ends
of the spectrum (exploitative and educational), the cases acknowledge
that the DOL factors are entitled to respect, but refrain from holding the
factors are conclusive. In determining the legality of unpaid internships
under the FLSA, employers should take a broad approach that considers
whether the internships benefit students without providing an unfair
advantage to the companies hosting the programs. But, to be certain,
employers should be able point to evidence that all of the DOL's factors
are present in their unpaid internship program.
Private for-profit employers must understand that internships need
educational structure. Recent public backlash against unpaid internships has spawned litigation against employers offering these positions,
and now employers must be more conscious about their activities.
Unpaid interns cannot be hired carelessly without proper planning and
legal consultation. Companies that use their interns as free labor have
drawn attention from federal regulators and savvy plaintiffs' attorneys.
Consequently, all employers must now consider their exposure as
employers who implement insufficiently supervised and poorly structured unpaid internship programs will be easy pickings for the FLSA
collective actions.
If money is not an object, employers should pay their interns at least
the federal minimum wage. However, if a company does not have the
financial resources to pay interns, the company can still provide a
valuable opportunity for students by setting up an internship program
with educating interns as priority number one.
CHRIS J. PERNICIARO

